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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper contrasts the success and failure of two 
electronic payment systems in Hong Kong, Octopus and 
Mondex, during 1996-2002. The case illustrates the new 
properties of electronic currencies, and provides insights for 
product designers and regulators.  Mondex was endowed 
with the full legal status of money, launched by a mammoth 
banking group, with Mondex cards given away for free to 
consumers. Yet the Mondex system went into oblivion 
within five years. Octopus started as a modest stored value 
transport ticket that required a deposit. It ended up as a city-
wide multipurpose payment card used by 95% of the adult 
population. The system has saved significant transaction 
costs from the handling of coins, generating heavy 
transactions and turnover volume. 
 
The success of Octopus and the failure of Mondex cannot 
be explained by marketing strategies or technical merits 
alone. The two systems sought to overcome user resistance 
in different approaches: Mondex relied on voluntary uptake, 
but Octopus imposed a compulsory switch upon a large 
base of commuters.  The case shows that in electronic 
currencies, large merchants and technology platforms are 
now in a better position to negotiate for what is valid money 
and what is not. Mondex, a legitimate and trustworthy 
source of money supply from the banking industry, failed to 
diffuse across the public. Meanwhile a large merchant 
group equipped with the point-of-sale device was able to 
define a new value token for the public. By controlling the 
material interface of electronic payment, the merchant side 
is playing a more active role in the loop of social consensus 
of money.1 
 
Keywords: Octopus, Mondex, electronic payment systems, 
consensus, electronic currency, digital cash, smart cards.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
In the world of plastic payment, credit cards and debit cards 
are the two major categories that have attained mature 
development. Each has developed its own system of 
verification, settlement and security, spanning a globalized 
hierarchical framework of trust and settlement [19]. 
However, demands for an electronic payment tool suitable 
for small payments in the range of US$0.5 - US$10 remain 
largely unfulfilled in most parts of the world.  For every day 
applications such as buying a coffee, a morning newspaper, 
paying for a bus ride, or feeding a parking meter, both 
merchants and consumers find it cumbersome to handle 
exact change in coins. Yet the transaction costs of credit 
cards and debit cards are formidable for these applications. 
It will also look outrageous if a passenger has to provide a 
signature, a fingerprint, or key in a chip-and-pin device in 
order to get onto a bus.  
 
Mondex and Octopus were two electronic payment projects 
aiming at small payments. Both projects started in Hong 
Kong in the mid 1990s, originating from different sectors. 
Mondex from the banking sector ended in failure, but 
Octopus from the transport sector (1997) became a 
remarkable innovation and success, which was widely 
referenced in the smart card industry. Octopus was a 
contactless payment card based on radio frequency 
identification (RFID) technology. No personal 
identification was held in the card, and the read/write 
process could be finished within 0.3 seconds. (See Table 3 
for more technical specifications.) 
 
In the past decade, contactless smart card solutions emerged 
in many cities around the world. Examples included 
MetroCard in New York (1997); Chicago Card (1999); 
EasyRider in Nottingham (2000); EZ-Link in Singapore 
(2001); Calypso in Paris (2001); Andante in Porto, Portugal 
(2002); Nagasaki SmartCard in Japan (2002); EasyCard in 
Taipei (2002); OysterCard in London (2003); Beijing 
Municipal Administration and Communications Card in 
Beijing (2003); SmarTrip in Washington DC (2004); 
LisbaoViva in Lisbon (2004); Breeze card in Atlanta (2006); 
ChalieCard in Boston (2006); Transcard in Shenzhen 
(2006); and Flexus in Oslo (2008). This list is schematic 
rather than exhaustive. The projects differed widely in 
terms of their degrees of success, showing that developers 
of smart card payment solutions had to face uncertainties 
and contingent local factors. 
 
In this paper I will provide a comparative account of the 
dramatic history of Mondex and Octopus, two electronic 
payment systems in Hong Kong in 1996-2002. Then the 
paper will explore the success of Octopus and the failure of 
Mondex from five dimensions: social consensus, network 
effect, “killer application”, precursor products, and point-
of-sales (POS) materiality.  
 
2. A TALE OF TWO MONEYS 
 
Mondex was an “electronic wallet” that stores monetary 
value on a microchip. It used to be a joint venture between 
banking conglomerate HSBC and MasterCard International. 
At the height of the project, Mondex cards were issued in 
over ten countries. Users could load monetary value from 
automatic teller machines to their Mondex cards, and spend 
money at retail merchant counters. 
 
In Hong Kong, the project was launched in Oct 1996 by 
HSBC and Hang Seng Bank, both being large banks under 
the HSBC group. The two banks jointly occupied one-third 
of the city’s banking deposits. At the Mondex launching 
ceremony in 1996, an executive from HSBC said he wished 
that Mondex could replace a substantial part of their cash 
stock in ten years’ time. A trendy and bright image was 
quickly built up. With visible marketing efforts, colourful 
pamphlets and commercials were spread around town. 
 
The annual charge of Mondex cards (HK$100) was 
waivered, such that account clients of the two banks 
actually got it for free. The project started out in two 
middle-class residential shopping malls, and was extended 
to three retail chains (Fortress, Watson’s and Park’n Shop), 
a university campus, and public sports facilities. Merchants 
and service providers were installed with Mondex readers at 
checkout counters. 
 
Mondex was never made compulsory. It was an option 
additional to cash, credit cards and debit cards. In general, 
users and merchants did not see any obvious benefits in 
switching to Mondex. Eight months after the launching 
ceremony, I tried to use my Mondex card in a drugstore in 
Cityplaza, one of the pilot shopping malls. The cashier 
frowned, knelt on the floor to search for the card reader 
underneath, and spent five minutes to operate it. She 
apologized for being unfamiliar with this device. “No one 
uses it. I have never seen a Mondex card for months.” After 
my transaction, a dozen of irritated customers were already 
lining up behind me. 
 
In fact Mondex never really took off in Hong Kong. 
Starting from 1999, HSBC and Hang Seng Bank adopted a 
more low-key position to this product, and seldom did any 
further marketing. Later on HSBC sold out all shares of 
Mondex to Mastercard International. Meanwhile, Mondex 
moved on to launch a new project in Taiwan [34]. In April 
2002 the Mondex project was formally terminated in Hong 
Kong [25]. The product was totally wiped out, but Eric Tai, 
the former project director of Mondex, became the CEO of 
Octopus in 2002-06 [10]. 
 
Octopus (former company name: Creative Star) was a joint 
venture between five public transport companies to develop 
a stored value transport card. The contactless feature was 
state-of-the-art technology in 1997, which enabled users to 
swing a whole handbag near the card reader and pay the 
exact fare. It was extremely quick and convenient for 
passengers in a hurry. The card could be reloaded at 
transport stations, where users feed banknotes into add 
value machines. 
 
The Octopus card was meant to replace the magnetic stored 
value ticket of the Mass Transit Railway (MTR), which was 
used for more than ten years. When Octopus was 
introduced, the MTR and the then Kowloon-Canton 
Railway (KCR) made all passengers replace their common 
stored value tickets into Octopus; otherwise their old tickets 
would be made obsolete in 2-3 months. The only alternative 
was a single journey ticket, the fare of which was higher 
and it had to be bought with coins and banknotes.2  The 
public quickly switched to the new Octopus card. Within 
the first three months, 3 million cards were sold out [30]. 
While Creative Star urged card manufacturer Sony to 
replenish new cards, there was a temporary shortage. 
 
There was widespread resentment of the HK$50 deposit 
taken for an Octopus card, and the loss of the previous “last 
ride discount” available to users of the magnetic tickets. 
Some elderly groups and political parties from Tuen Mun, a 
district with a high ratio of the lower income groups, 
protested against the Light Rail Transit (LRT) for adding 
financial burden to the poor. In return, the LRT offered the 
elderly a discount for a short period. 
 
User resistance only lasted for the first few months. 
Afterwards there was not much news from Octopus. The 
public got used to the new card and enjoyed the 
convenience it brought. Transaction volume and the number 
of cards issued increased steadily, and the system was 
extended to more than 15 transport applications. Auxiliary 
applications included photo booths in MTR stations and 
parking meters [9]. 
 
In the early stage, the community rarely perceived Octopus 
as a form of cash. The spotlight of local press reports was 
on the “war of standards” between Mondex and VisaCash, 
but Octopus was not seen as a direct competitor. The 
Economist in 1998 lamented the apathy shown towards 
electronic cash, without taking into account the high 
transaction volume of Octopus. 
 
                                                 
2 Passengers using Octopus enjoyed a 10% fare discount. 
Table 1: Background of the two electronic payment systems 
 Mondex Octopus 
Founding 
members 
Financial sector 
HSBC, Hang Seng Bank, Mastercard 
International 
Transport sector 
Creative Star – joint venture between 
five transport companies 
Local market 
share 
HSBC issues 64.4% of Hong Kong’s 
currency (2002) [14] 
HSBC and Hang Seng deposit 32.5% of 
Hong Kong’s M2 money supply (2001)3  
Mass Transit Railway (MTR): 11 
million passenger journeys per day 
(total population was 6 million) 
System cost Information unavailable US$53 million 
Issuer Licensed banks Authorized deposit-taking organization 
(2000) 
 
Table 2: Outcome of user acceptance 
 Mondex Octopus 
Pilot phase, trial quantity (1996) 
0.19 million (Nov 1998) [6] 
Pilot phase, trial quantity (1997) 
4.6 million (Nov 1998) 
Cards issued 
Below 0.1 million (Feb 2002) [13] 9 million (Feb 2002) [21] 
17 million (Jun 2008) 
No. of 
merchants 
8000 [6] 
Most are retail shops 
120 (2002)  [21] 
Most were conglomerate chains 
Over 2000 (Jun 2008)  
Daily 
transactions 
Not disclosed Over 7 million (Feb 2002) [21] 
Over 10 million, turnover HK$85 
million (Jun 2008)  
Profit Never attained profit HK$18 million (2000) [20] 
Outcome User resistance 
Low usage 
HSBC sold out all shares 
Hong Kong project terminated (2002) [1]
City-wide acceptance 
High regular turnover 
HKMA released previous 15% 
restriction on non-transport purposes 
(2000) [21] 
 
Table 3: Comparison on technical and marketing merits 
 Mondex Octopus 
User cost (+) Free (HK$100 fee waivered) (-) HK$50 deposit (US$6.41) 
Legal Status (+) Full legal status of money (-) Limited legal status / area of use 
Launching time (+) Oct 1996 (-) Sep 1997 
Privacy concern (-) Holds personal information, linked to 
bank account 
(+) Contains no personal info 
(Later on optional varieties linked up with 
bank accounts and award programs) 
Contact mode (-) Need contact to read/write (+) Contactless read/write 
Speed (-) Read/write time: 5 seconds 
Date transmission: 9.6 kbit/s 
(+) Read/write time: 0.3 seconds 
Data transmission: 212 kbit/s 
Specifications MULTOS chip 
Patented issuance and update mechanism: 
STEP (Secure Trusted Environment 
Provisioning) 
Verification and encryption: KMA (key 
management authority) 
Sony 13.56 MHz RFID (FeliCa radio 
frequency identification) chip 
Proprietary standard predating the ISO/IEC 
14443 standard 
ERG (Australian) as system integrator 
PKI (public key infrastructure) encryption 
Two-way authentication 
(+) Merit    (-) Disadvantage 
                                                 
3 The total deposit of HSBC Hong Kong was HK$722,285 million; the total deposit of Hang Seng Bank Hong Kong was HK$414,328 
million [16]. From the HKMA online resource centre, Hong Kong’s M2 money supply in 2001 was HK$3,501 billion. 
“Even the people of Hong Kong and Singapore – notorious 
technophiles and shoppers – seem unenthusiastic… the total 
volume of cashless transactions in Hong Kong is still 
estimated at less than $10m a year – just $30 for each user.”
  
 “Keep the Change”, the Economist, 19 Nov 1998 
 
In fact in November 1998, Octopus had quietly reached a 
daily transaction volume over HK$20 million [11], 
equivalent to US$203 per Octopus user in a year. 
 
In 2000, Octopus jumped on to non-transport purposes such 
as convenience stores, school tuck shops, self-serviced 
photocopy machines, and vending machines. Add value 
points extended from transport stations to hundreds of 
convenience stores. Octopus also cooperated with smaller 
banks to launch the Octopus automatic add value service, 
where a customer may link their Octopus to his/her credit 
card for automatic reloading. The application was extended 
to 21 banks and financial partners (including large ones) in 
2008. 
 
Response was very positive, for over 80% of the city’s 
population already had an Octopus card in their pockets. In 
transactions below HK$10 (US$1.28), especially in self-
serviced machines where exact change was needed, people 
were glad to get rid of their dimes and nickels. This move 
towards non-transport purposes was made possible by the 
monetary regulators. Possibly realizing the failures of 
Mondex and VisaCash in Hong Kong, in 2000 the Hong 
Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) issued a deposit-taking 
company license to Octopus, relaxing the previous 15% 
restriction from the percentage of turnover from non-
transport purposes. After Mondex announced its withdrawal 
from Hong Kong in 2002, the outcome of user acceptance 
was clear. A summary of user response is given in Table 2, 
and the two systems are compared for their marketing and 
technical conditions in Table 3. 
 
3. SOCIAL CONSENSUS 
 
What makes a form of token valid money? For regulators 
and the banking sector, the answer usually includes the 
backing of a sound issuing bank, public trust towards state 
and monetary authorities, the intricate control of currency 
supply, and measures to prevent counterfeits. Banknotes 
and coins are issued from a single source of legitimacy 
through national mints or authorized issuing banks. Cash 
enters the market through authorized banks, and then 
circulates around a transaction network made up by banks, 
merchants and consumers. 
 
The case of Mondex and Octopus in 1996-2001 was 
intriguing to the regulators. The Hong Kong Monetary 
Authority [13] found that citizens refused to use Mondex, a 
form of legal tender prepared by a full-status issuing bank. 
Instead they chose to use Octopus, a stored value card 
initiated from the merchant side alone. Transactions were so 
successful that the Octopus company was in a good position 
to negotiate with the regulators, who decided to upgrade the 
status of Octopus from that of single-purpose stored value 
card to multi-purpose stored value card. The approval was 
granted in 2000 on the grounds of promoting innovation. 
However, research reports from the HKMA [13][15] raised 
a remaining concern: how should regulators respond to the 
popularity of a payment token produced by a non-bank 
organization? Does the case of Octopus suggest that the rise 
of electronic currencies may lead to “erosion of seignorage”? 
 
From a sociological perspective, money works by social 
consensus [3][24] - a shared awareness that “everybody 
else” in the exchange community will also accept the same 
token at equivalent value. John and Mary recognise the 
value of a US$10 banknote, because they know that others 
in the economy also recognise the same thing. What matters 
is not the material worth of the token’s constituent ink, 
paper, metal or plastic. What makes money work is the 
shared consensus that others will also accept the same token. 
In classical banknotes, such consensus is largely based upon 
the issuer’s guarantee that the token bearer will be paid in 
full, and the public’s trust in this guarantee. Consensus is 
mutually reinforced in a feedback loop [3], supported by the 
legitimacy and trustworthiness of the originating source of 
supply. 
 
Yet in the case of Mondex and Octopus, a currency with 
superior legitimacy and trustworthiness (from a classical 
banking point of view) failed to establish this social 
consensus, while Octopus succeeded. Technological and 
sociological factors were playing an important role here. 
 
4. NETWORK EFFECT 
 
Technological products are extremely sensitive to the initial 
size of their user base. There are at least three reasons why 
a large enough user base needs to be established in an early 
phase: network effect [17], path-dependent lock-in [2] [18], 
and economy of scale. Network effect means that the value 
of a product or service depends on how many people are 
already using it. Take the telephone network as an example. 
A standalone phone is useless, and two phones connected 
by a wire is only an intercom. Yet as the number of 
subscribers increases, each new subscriber becomes a 
potential node of communication, incrementally turning the 
telephone system into a powerful communication network.  
 
In the case of Mondex and Octopus, adoption of the 
payment tool is a two-side scenario between merchants and 
consumers. If a large number of consumers are already 
using the payment card, it becomes more attractive for a 
new merchant to accept payment from it; vice versa if more 
merchants are already accepting payment from it, the more 
attractive it will appear for a new consumer to put the 
payment card in his/her purse. Once an initial user base is 
captured, the system will be continually tested, improved 
and extended. The setup and operation cost for the payment 
card, point-of-sale (POS) equipment and backend networks 
can also be reduced by economy of scale. A determinant 
factor between success and failure is whether the payment 
card can capture a large enough regular user base, and 
capture it quick enough. In the case of Octopus, the 
successful capture of an initial user base leads to a benign 
cycle of growth and development. In the case of Mondex, 
failure to do so leads to a vicious cycle of apathy and 
resistance. This may look straightforward with hindsight, 
but readers are reminded that product innovation is an 
uncertain process; it is difficult to predict the pattern of user 
response during planning and design stage. 
 
5. KILLER APPLICATION 
 
The two systems took very different approaches to capture 
their initial user base. Mondex took a “democratic” 
approach. It reached out to merchants by negotiated 
partnerships and to consumers by incentive programs. The 
use of Mondex was on voluntary basis, and the Mondex 
program seemed to underestimate the inertia of existing 
payment habits. Amongst 8,000 heterogeneous retail shops, 
the incentive program was lack of focus. It could hardly 
differentiate from other shopping discounts, and consumers 
did not see a vital need to switch to Mondex. 
 
Octopus took a “coercive” approach. From the beginning it 
only focused on five merchants in public transport. Out of 
the five companies, a compulsory switch was imposed by 
the two railway systems. Regular commuters on the two 
metro systems found no alternatives but to switch to 
Octopus - single journey tickets and other public transport 
were far from ideal substitutes. It could be argued that the 
two railway companies were, to some extent, manipulating 
their monopolistic position in an enclosed public utility, 
leaving little choices for consumers but to start using 
Octopus. Nevertheless, such a coercive approach proved to 
be effective in overcoming user resistance [8], changing 
user habits, and bringing benefits to both the transport and 
consumer sectors.  
 
Octopus managed to capture a large initial user base 
because of its distinctive “killer application”: as stored 
value ticket for passengers of the MTR and KCR. In 
computer science, the term “killer application” refers to 
remarkably successful application programs such as the 
spreadsheet program Visicalc on Apple II, Lotus 1-2-3 on 
IBM personal computers, desktop publishing software 
Pagemaker on Macintosh, and the game Star Raiders on the 
early Atari game platform [5]. The applications were so 
successful (or essential) that users were willing to take up a 
new technical platform for the sake of the application. 
Unfortunately for Mondex, its fate was partly sealed by the 
absence of such applications.   
 
6. PRECURSOR PRODUCTS 
 
For metro passengers in Hong Kong, Octopus was 
presented as the next-generation ticket after the magnetic 
stored value ticket, which had been widely adopted for over 
ten years. The presence of a precursor product helped 
passengers to get used to a stored value cash card in their 
purse and to lower user resistance. Meanwhile, the decision 
to discontinue the magnetic cards altogether removed any 
competition from them. 
 
On the contrary, Mondex was facing competition from a 
well-established mix of existing payment tools, namely 
cash, debit cards and credit cards. It was impossible for 
retailers to cease using them without harming business. 
Seemingly Mondex did not possess clear advantages to 
“squeeze its way through” at payment counters. It could be 
argued that the genuine competition faced by Mondex came 
from cash, debit cards and credit cards instead of Octopus.  
 
7. POINT-OF-SALES MATERIALITY 
 
In the circulation of money, it should be noted that smart 
card payment systems are introducing a new component, 
the point-of-sale (POS) interface into the money circuit. In 
the exchange of traditional cash, economic value is 
embodied by a piece of paper or metal, where receivers 
usually accept the token with bare hands. Standardization 
was controlled by the regulator and the issuing bank.  
 
With the arrival of the POS device, large merchants are now 
equipped with a new filter to decide what is valid money 
and what is not. If the money token does not pass through 
the POS device, it is unusable despite whatever authority 
and legitimacy it carries. For large merchants in possession 
of a unique public utility, such as the MTR and the KCR, 
they can now take part in negotiating the standard of valid 
money by controlling access and technical compatibility.  
 
When passengers pass through the MTR turnstiles on a 
daily basis, the mesmerising beep of Octopus and the 
smooth access to escalators, trains and stations give users a 
form of trust different from that of an issuing bank. The 
railway companies did not have the legal status of banks, 
but the railway infrastructure could serve as an alternative 
form of guarantee. From a social point of view, the card is 
useful and it works in the passenger’s daily life. This is 
especially true for a dense city heavily relying on the metro 
as its major form of transport. Some Hong Kong people 
even relate their cultural identity to Octopus, as shown in 
the Facebook group “‘Doot’ [beep] through life with that 
Octopus card” with over 11,000 members in June 2008.  
 
8. CONCLUSION 
 
The history of Octopus and Mondex is a strong case to 
illustrate the dual properties of electronic currencies: they 
are moneys as well as technological artefacts. When 
developing a new product, it is important that product 
designers, marketing personnel, and regulators take both 
monetary and technological aspects into considerations.  
 
Success factors of Octopus include a densely populated city, 
an essential public utility, presence of a precursor product 
(“ticket”), social trust from daily material contact, a 
compulsory switch, and the absence of perfect substitutes. 
The payment system was adopted widely and rapidly across 
the population. 
 
The case also carries implications for regulators, as 
materiality factor at the POS is bringing changes to the 
social consensus of money. Solomon [28] suggests that 
when money goes electronic, merchants, technology firms 
and telecom corporations will play a more active role in 
finance. The tension between banks and non-banks, 
regulation for non-banks, and economic stability will pose 
new challenges to regulators. In the case of Octopus, the 
HKMA had attempted to balance between financial stability 
and not to stifle non-bank innovations [13]. The outcome to 
the local economy was a healthy one. In the future, money 
regulators and banks can expect more partnerships, 
negotiations and competition to arise from non-bank 
organizations. 
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